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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a medical indigency case. St. Luke's Health System, Ltd. ("St. Luke's") appeals 
the Gem County District Court's decision affirming the determination of the Board of 
Commissioners of Gem County (the "County" or "Board") that certain dates of service provided 
to C.H. (the "Patient") were not compensable as "necessary medical services" under the Medical 
Indigency Act, Idaho Code Section 31-3501, et seq. (the "Medical Indigency Act"). 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The Patient was treated at St. Luke's from January 26, 2016, to March 9, 2016. See 
Medical Indigency Hearing - Executive Session, Transcript of Medical Indigency Case 
No. 2016-026 ("Agency Tr."), p. 4. On September 19, 2016, based on an application for County 
aid submitted by St. Luke's, the County issued an Initial Determination of Approval for County 
Assistance as to certain dates of service. 
1 
Agency Record ("AR") at 14. The Initial 
Determination found the Patient medically indigent, but denied dates of service from February 3, 
2016, to March 9, 2016. AR at 14. St. Luke's timely appealed the denial of the remaining dates. 
AR at 9. 
On February 6, 2017, a hearing was held before the Board regarding its pnor 
determination that services provided after February 2, 2016, were not medically necessary. See 
generally, Agency Tr., pp. 1-21. St. Luke's appeared, inquired regarding the County's medical 
review, and offered evidence, argument, and authority demonstrating that all dates of service 
from January 26, 2016, through March 9, 2016, were compensable under the Medical Indigency 
Act. See Agency Tr., pp. 7-21; AR at 313-25. 
1 
The Agency Transcript and the Agency Record are included in the Clerk's Record on Appeal 
as exhibits. See R. at 85. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 1 
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On February 6, 2017, the Board issued an Amended Determination of Approval for 
County Assistance. AR at 11-13. The Board maintained its denial of payment as to dates of 
service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016. AR at 11-13. Thereafter, St. Luke's timely 
filed a petition for judicial review with the Gem County District Court. R. at 3. 
St. Luke's and Gem County submitted briefs and a hearing on the petition for judicial 
review was held on October 10, 2017, before the Honorable George A. Southworth, District 
Judge, Third Judicial District, County of Gem. Judicial Review Hearing Transcript ("Tr."), p. 1. 
On October 18, 2017, the District Court entered its Order on Judicial Review affirming the 
Board's decision to deny county assistance for dates of service February 19, 2016, through 
March 9, 2016. R. at 76-77. Thereafter, St. Luke's timely filed this appeal. R. at 79. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
The facts of this case are undisputed. Tr., p. 25, 11. 24-25 ("As the parties have 
acknowledged, there's really no dispute of facts."); Tr., p. 34, 11. 10-11 ("[A]gain the facts here 
are undisputed"). The Patient was treated at St. Luke's for meningitis and severe brain lesions 
between January 26, 2016, and March 9, 2016, and also received additional inpatient care 
thereafter at a different facility on the condition that St. Luke's pay for the care. Agency Tr., 
p. 4; AR at 278-86. There is no dispute that the Patient is an indigent resident of the State of 
Idaho and Gem County is obligated under Idaho Code Section 31-3506. AR at 11-13. Indeed, 
the County ultimately approved the Application with respect to certain treatment rendered to the 
Patient from January 26, 2016, through February 18, 2016. Id. 
The Patient was admitted emergently on January 26, 2016, after being found 
unconscious. Tr., p. 4. She received emergency treatment. As early as February 5, 2016, 
St. Luke's began assessing the propriety of a lower level of care at a long-term acute care 
hospital, although acknowledging the reality that the Patient's lack of a payment source would 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 2 
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likely be a "barrier for placement." See AR at 317; see also Tr., p. 26, 11. 18-22. On 
February 16, 2016, St. Luke's contacted Meridian Care regarding placing the Patient in a lower 
level of care, but it would not take the Patient because of her lack of financial resources. See AR 
at 316. The following day, St. Luke's contacted two additional facilities, which likewise 
declined to admit the Patient because she was self-pay. Id. Another facility declined admission 
on the basis that the Patient did not have a primary care physician that would follow her to the 
facility. Id. 
On February 22, 2016, St. Luke's contacted two additional inpatient facilities, and on 
February 25, 2016, each facility declined to take the Patient due to concerns about the Patient's 
clinical status. See AR at 315. Two additional facilities evaluated the Patient beginning on 
February 25, 2016, and finally, on March 9, 2016, the Patient discharged to Life Care Treasure 
Valley ("Life Care"). See AR at 314-15. Of significant note, before Life Care would agree to 
admit the Patient, however, a single patient agreement was negotiated that required St. Luke's to 
be financially responsible for the charges incurred at the lower level of care. See Agency Tr., 
2 
p. 10, 11. 16-25; AR at 320-25. 
On May 16, 2016, Dr. Dammrose submitted a utilization management review. See AR at 
24-27. The review determined that the care provided after February 3, 2016, was not medically 
necessary because the County had apparently not submitted medical records to Dr. Dammrose 
3 
for that care. See AR at 25. 
2 
St. Luke's is not seeking compensation for the amounts it paid to Life Care on the Patient's 
behalf. St. Luke's is only seeking compensation for the dates of denied service from 
February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016, when the Patient was still at St. Luke's. 
3 Dr. Dammrose's May 16, 2016, report states: "The 02/04/2016 to 03/09/2016 inpatient stay 
is considered not medically necessary based for purposes of payment since no medical records 
are provided for those dates of service other than a note about insertion of a feeding tube on 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 3 
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On October 24, 2016, after the County submitted additional medical records, 
Dr. Dammrose amended his review, finding that "the additional clinical notes indicate the patient 
was medically stable on 02/12 and it appears she no longer needed the services of an acute care 
inpatient hospital." See AR at 33. 
On November 16, 2016, after the receipt of additional physician's notes, Dr. Dammrose 
again amended his review, finding that the Patient "was medically stable on 02/19 and it appears 
she no longer needed the services of an acute care inpatient hospital." Id. 
On February 6, 2017, St. Luke's participated in an appeal hearing regarding the denied 
dates of service. St. Luke's did not, and does not, dispute Dr. Dammrose's opinion that the 
Patient was sufficiently stabilized by February 19, 2016, such that, to the extent available, 
treatment at a lower level facility, rather than a short-term acute care hospital such as St. Luke's, 
was appropriate from a clinical standpoint. St. Luke's presented evidence of its substantial 
efforts, beginning in early February, to locate a more cost-effective medical facility equipped to 
provide the level of care required for the Patient. See AR at 313-25; Tr., p. 9. Importantly, there 
is no dispute that the Patient could not have been simply discharged home. See Tr., p. 34, 11. 19-
22 ("[The Patient] no longer needed St. Luke's but did require a facility to provide her with a 
lower level of care of rehabilitative care before she could be discharged home."); Tr., p. 26, 
11. 22-25 ("Both parties agree that [the Patient] ... could not have been simply discharged to 
home[.]"); AR at 313. Therefore, the ability to provide the Patient with care at a lower level 
02/1 O." AR at 25. However, the record shows that St. Luke's submitted its medical records to 
the County on April 6, 2016. AR at 43. Included in those records, among other things, were the 
medical notes for dates of service February 3, 2016, to February 13, 2016. AR at 76-81. In 
particular, the notes submitted by St. Luke's included the notes from a chest X-ray conducted on 
February 13, 2016. AR at 81. Yet, according to Dr. Dammrose's report on November 16, 2016, 
those notes, including the notes from the chest X-ray conducted on February 13, 2016, were not 
provided to him until October 19, 2016. AR at 3 7 ("On 10/19 the County provided additional 
information ... [which] indicated an improved chest X-ray on 02/13[.]"). 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 4 
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facility depended entirely upon the willingness of an equipped facility to accept and admit the 
Patient. 
Dr. Dammrose is a physician who provided only a clinical opinion that a lower level of 
care was appropriate from a clinical standpoint and none of his reports suggest that care at such a 
lower level facility was actually available to this Patient. See AR at 24-40. During the hearing, 
St. Luke's addressed at length the efforts it undertook to try to find a facility willing to accept the 
Patient without a payer source, and that it was only able to ultimately find such a facility upon 
agreement that St. Luke's actually paid for such care. Agency Tr., pp. 8-11. The County did not 
present any evidence suggesting or otherwise even claim that there was more cost-effective care 
actually available to treat the Patient. See Agency Tr., p. 14, 1. 12-p. 15, 1. 4; p. 20, 11. 1-17; see 
also generally, Agency Tr., pp. 3-21. The County did not contend St. Luke's efforts to place the 
Patient at a different facility were not sufficiently diligent or otherwise inappropriate. Id. At the 
close of the hearing, counsel for the County acknowledged that St. Luke's had done what it 
should have done. Id., p. 20, 11. 5-6 ("I don't think anybody in this room is saying, hey, they 
didn't ... do what they should have done."). There was also no contention by the County that 
the Patient had failed to avail herself of available treatment at a lower cost facility. See Agency 
Tr., p. 14, 1. 12 - p. 15, 1. 4; p. 20, 11. 1-17; see also generally, Agency Tr., pp. 3-21. 
Nonetheless, without noting or even discussing the actual availability of a facility willing to 
provide ongoing care, the Board upheld the denial of treatment from February 19, 2016, to 
March 9, 2016. See Agency Tr., pp. 20-21. As such, even though it is clear the Patient is 
indigent, she would be legally responsible to pay the full bill for those dates of service. 
After the hearing, the Board issued its Amended Determination of Approval for County 
Assistance ("Final Order"). AR at 11-13. In its Final Order, the Board does not include any 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF- 5 
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findings of fact or conclusions of law and does not specify or indicate why it was not approving 
dates of service from February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016. Id. In fact, there is no mention 
of that date range at all or any reasons why those dates were not included in the approval. Id. 
On review to the District Court, St. Luke's again argued that cost-effective care must 
actually be available to a patient before it can be considered when deciding what treatment is 
medically necessary under the Medical Indigency Act. R. at 21-28. St. Luke's also argued that 
the Board's decision was not based on the evidence in the record and was an abuse of the 
Board's discretion. R. at 6, 9, 10, 11, 14. Again, the County did not present any evidence or 
argue that there was actually any lower level of care available to this Patient. R. at 1-11. The 
District Court affirmed the Board. R. at 76-78. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Board violated statutory provisions and exceeded its statutory 
authority in denying dates of service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016, where care at a 
lower cost facility was unavailable to the Patient. 
2. Whether the Board's decision to deny dates of service February 19, 2016, through 
March 9, 2016, was based on substantial evidence and was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. 
3. Whether St. Luke's rights have been prejudiced. 
4. Whether St. Luke's is entitled to costs and attorney's fees. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"A county's denial of an application for indigency benefits is reviewed under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code." Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. 
Nez Perce Cnty. Comm 'rs, 138 Idaho 215, 216, 61 P.3d 572, 573 (2002). "Judicial review of an 
administrative order is limited to the record." Shobe v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 130 Idaho 
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580, 583, 944 P.2d 715, 718 (1997). Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an appellant is 
entitled to relief if the county's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions were (1) in 
violation of statutory or constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the 
commissioners; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; ( 4) not supported by substantial evidence on 
the record as a whole; or (5) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Saint Alphonsus 
Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. Elmore Cnty., 158 Idaho 648, 650, 350 P.3d 1025, 1027 (2015) (quoting 
LC. § 67-5279(3)). 
On issues of law and statutory interpretation, an appellate court freely reviews the 
interpretation of a statute and its application to the facts. See St. Luke's Reg 'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. 
Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). As to questions of 
fact, judicial review of an administrative order is limited to the record, and the reviewing court 
may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. Application of Ackerman, 
127 Idaho 495, 903 P.2d 84 (1995). 
A reviewing court may reverse the decision of the county only if the substantial rights of 
the appellant have been prejudiced. LC. § 67-5279(4). Finally, "[i]f the agency action is not 
affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as 
necessary." LC. § 67-5279(3). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
This case is largely a question of statutory interpretation. There is no question that the 
Patient was indigent and the underlying facts are undisputed. Tr., p. 25, 11. 24-25 ("As the 
parties have acknowledged, there's really no dispute of facts."); Tr., p. 34, 11. 11-13. The 
fundamental question for the Court to answer is as follows: Under the Medical Indigency Act, 
can the County appropriately deny the medical necessity of treatment to this Patient based upon 
the clinical appropriateness of care being delivered at a lower cost facility, when no lower cost 
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facility was willing to accept and treat the Patient. Given the plain language of the Act, the 
expressly stated policy behind the Act, and existing Idaho Supreme Court precedent, it should be 
readily apparent that only medical care that is actually available to the Patient should be 
considered by the Board in its medical necessity analysis. Accordingly, it is clear that the denied 
dates of service were compensable necessary medical services. It further follows that the Board 
exceeded its statutory authority by denying the Patient eligibility for those treatment dates and, 
by doing so, acted without a basis in substantial evidence and such action was arbitrary and 
capnc10us. 
A. The Board Acted in Violation of Statutory Provisions and Exceeded Its 
Statutory Authority When It Denied the Dates of Service February 19, 2016, 
to March 9, 2016, as Being Not Medically Necessary. 
Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) is clear and unambiguous. It plainly requires medical 
services to be actually available when considering whether care is a necessary medical service. 
Further, even if it was ambiguous, the cannons of statutory interpretation dictate an interpretation 
that requires medical services to be actually available when determining whether services are 
necessary medical services. 
1. The plain language of Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) establishes that 
the denied dates of service were compensable necessary medical 
services and the Board acted in violation of statutory provisions and 
exceeded its statutory authority by denying compensation for those 
dates. 
Statutory interpretation begins with '"the literal words of the statute, and this language 
should be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning."' Seward v. Pac. Hide & Fur Depot, 
138 Idaho 509, 511, 65 P.3d 531, 533 (2003) (quoting Jen-Rath Co. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 
330, 335, 48 P.3d 659, 664 (2002)). "If the statutory language is unambiguous, 'the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court 
to consider rules of statutory construction."' St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd., 146 Idaho at 755, 
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203 P.3d at 685 (quoting Payette River Prop. Owners Ass 'n v. Ed. of Comm 'rs of Valley Cnty., 
132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477,483 (1999)). 
A statute is ambiguous when: 
[T]he meaning is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds 
might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. However, 
ambiguity is not established merely because different possible 
interpretations are presented to a court. If this were the case then 
all statutes that are the subject of litigation could be considered 
ambiguous .... [A] statute is not ambiguous merely because an 
astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it. 
Jayo Dev., Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Ed. of Equalization, 158 Idaho 148, 152, 345 P.3d 207, 211 (2015) 
(quoting Farmers Nat'! Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 856, 318 P.3d 622, 625 
(2014)). 
Here, the statutes at issue are unambiguously clear. Idaho Code Section 31-3503 
provides: "Powers and duties of county commissioners. The county commissioners ... shall 
... pay for necessary medical services of the medically indigent[.]" I.C. § 31-3503(1) (second 
emphasis added). "Necessary medical services" is defined in Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18). 
In its entirety, Section 31-3502(18) reads: 
(18) A "Necessary medical services" means health care services 
and supplies that: 
(a) Health care providers, exercising prudent clinical judgment, 
would provide to a person for the purpose of preventing, 
evaluating, diagnosing or treating an illness, injury, disease or its 
symptoms; 
(b) Are in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical 
practice; 
( c) Are clinically appropriate, in terms of type, frequency, extent, 
site and duration and are considered effective for the covered 
person's illness, injury or disease; 
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( d) Are not provided primarily for the convenience of the person, 
physician or other health care provider; and 
( e) Are the most cost-effective service or sequence of services or 
supplies, and at least as likely to produce equivalent therapeutic or 
diagnostic results for the person's illness, injury or disease. 
B. Necessary medical services shall not include the following: 
(a) Bone marrow transplants; 
(b) Organ transplants; 
( c) Elective, cosmetic and/or experimental procedures; 
( d) Services related to, or provided by, residential, skilled nursing, 
assisted living and/or shelter care facilities; 
(e) Normal, uncomplicated pregnancies, excluding caesarean 
section, and childbirth well-baby care; 
(f) Medicare copayments and deductibles; 
(g) Services provided by, or available to, an applicant from state, 
federal and local health programs; 
(h) Medicaid copayments and deductibles; and 
(i) Drugs, devices or procedures primarily utilized for weight 
reduction and complications directly related to such drugs, devices 
or procedures. 
The only issue addressed at the hearing before the Board and argument raised by the 
parties thereto, was whether care at a lower cost facility was clinically appropriate for this Patient 
and the availability of a facility willing to admit the Patient. See generally Agency Tr., pp. 3-21. 
Counsel and staff for the County appeared to be advocating the position that the availability of a 
facility willing and able to provide a lower level of care was immaterial under the Medical 
Indigency Act and that because Dr. Dammrose's clinical opinion was that a lower level of care 
was appropriate, the care provided by St. Luke's during the dates at issue was not medically 
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necessary regardless of whether lower level care was actually available. Id.; p. 20, 11. 1-14. The 
Board, however, failed to address the availability of care in its Final Order. AR at 11-13. 
Similarly, in the Order on Judicial Review, the District Court notes: "The Act defines 'necessary 
medical services' as services that are 'clinically appropriate' and 'the most cost-effective service' 
and shall not include 'services provided by, or available to, an applicant from state, federal and 
local health programs.' LC. § 31-3502(18)." R. at 76-77. The District Court noted that the 
Patient was no longer in need of services at a short-term acute care hospital, but it did not 
address the impact of the unavailability of a lower cost facility willing to accept the Patient. Id. 
The failure to consider the actual availability of the care being considered for purposes of 
determining medical necessity under Section 31-3502(18) contradicts the plain language of the 
statute. 
The plain language of Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) clearly requires that only those 
services that are actually available to the Patient are to be considered when determining whether 
the services rendered "[a]re the most cost-effective." In pertinent part, subsection 18A(e) 
requires that necessary medical services: "Are the most cost-effective service or sequence of 
services .... " LC. § 31-3502(18)A(e) (emphasis added). Thus, in order to be a "necessary 
medical service," the services being provided "are" to be the most cost-effective. The use of the 
affirmative verb "are" clearly indicates that the services rendered to the patient must be actual, 
rather than hypothetical or theoretical, services. There is no suggestion from this verb choice 
that the services to be considered are those that are merely potential, such as would be the case if 
the statute employed the words "would be." Rather, by using the affirmative "are," the statute 
plainly contemplates that the services to be considered are those actually available to be 
employed to produce the "therapeutic or diagnostic results for the person's illness, injury or 
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disease." Id. By its plain language, the statute requires that the necessary medical services 
"[a]re the most cost-effective service" available, not that the medical services "[would be] the 
most cost-effective service" if only such service was available. Id. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that although the Patient no longer needed all the 
services of a short-term acute hospital, such as St. Luke's, the Patient could not be discharged to 
home and still required further treatment at an inpatient facility. See Tr., p. 34, 11. 19-22 ("[The 
Patient] no longer needed St. Luke's but did require a facility to provide her with a lower level of 
care of rehabilitative care before she could be discharged home."); Tr., p. 26, 11. 22-25 ("Both 
parties agree that [the Patient] ... could not have been simply discharged to home[.]"); AR at 
313; AR at 3 7 (noting that the Patient was still "considered unsafe for discharge"). It is also 
undisputed that there were no more cost-effective facilities that were able and willing to take the 
Patient until March 9, 2016.4 Tr., p. 34, 11. 15-25. 
Simply put, there is no question that the Patient still required necessary inpatient services 
from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, and there is no question that St. Luke's was the only 
facility that could and would provide those services. Id.; Tr., p. 27, 11. 2-5; see generally Agency 
Tr., pp. 3-21 (County does not dispute that there were no other available facilities or suggest that 
there was a facility other than St. Luke's that was actually available to the Patient). Thus, while 
other facilities "[would be] more cost-effective," those facilities were not available to the 
Patient. In contrast, St. Luke's services were the only services available to the Patient, and 
therefore by definition they "[a]re the most cost-effective service." See St. Joseph Reg'! Med. 
4 
This is true despite significant efforts by St. Luke's to transfer the Patient. See supra at pp. 
2-3; AR at 316. Even on March 9, 2016, a facility was only willing to take the Patient because 
St. Luke's agreed to be financially responsible for the charges. See Agency Tr., p. 10, 11. 16-25; 
AR at 320-25. 
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Ctr. v. Nez Perce Cnty. Comm 'rs, 134 Idaho 486, 490, 5 P.3d 466, 470 (2000) (holding that 
Idaho Code Section 18-3502(18)B(g) requires resources to be "actually available" to a patient 
before they can be considered as resources under the Medical Indigency Act). 
Because there is no dispute that inpatient services were still medically appropriate, see 
Tr., p. 34, 11. 19-22; Tr., p. 26, 11. 22-25; AR at 313; AR at 37, and because there is no dispute 
that from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, the only facility that would provide the needed 
treatment was St. Luke's, Tr., p. 34, 11. 15-25; Tr., p. 27, 11. 2-5; see generally Agency Tr., 
pp. 3-21, the services provided by St. Luke's "[a]re the most cost-effective service or sequence 
of services." As such, the services provided by St. Luke's were "necessary medical services" as 
defined under Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18). 
Accordingly, because the dates of service from February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, 
were, by the plain language ofldaho Code Section 31-3502(18), necessary medical services, the 
Board was required to approve them for payment. LC. § 31-3503(1) ("The county 
commissioners ... shall ... pay for necessary medical services of the medically indigent[.]" 
(emphasis added)); Twin Falls Cnty. v. Idaho Comm 'non Redistricting, 152 Idaho 346, 349, 271 
P.3d 1202, 1205 (2012) ("The words 'must' and 'shall' are mandatory[.]"). By denying payment 
for the dates of service at issue, the Board violated the provisions of the Medical Indigency Act 
and thereby exceeded its statutory authority. 
2. Even if Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) is ambiguous, the cannons of 
statutory construction dictate an interpretation that would require 
medical services to be actually available when determining whether 
care is a necessary medical service. 
Only when a statute is ambiguous will the court engage in statutory construction. State v. 
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,476,163 P.3d 1183, 1188 (2007) ("If the language of the statute is 
reasonably susceptible of only one interpretation, the statute is unambiguous and there is no 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 13 
40914.0131.11106777.7 
occasion to look beyond the text of the statute."). While St. Luke's, for the reasons stated above, 
believes the statute at issue is unambiguous, even if it was ambiguous, the result would be the 
same. 
"If it is necessary for this Court to interpret a statute, the Court will attempt to ascertain 
legislative intent, and in construing a statute, may examine the language used, the reasonableness 
of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute." St. Luke's Reg 'l Med. Ctr., 
Ltd. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). Further, in 
interpreting a statute the court will look to "the whole act and every word therein" Carrier v. 
Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist., 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). "[A] statute is 
viewed as a whole and not in parts or sections, and is animated by its general purpose and intent. 
Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or 
section so as to produce a harmonious whole." City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, Inc.,_ 
Idaho_, 416 P. 3d 951, 956 (2018) (internal quote marks and citation omitted). 
Applying these principles to Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) leads to the conclusion that 
in order for a service to be considered the "most cost-effective service," that service must be 
actually available to the Patient. 
a. Considering the statute as a whole. 
When considered as a whole, it is apparent that the statute contemplates that when 
determining which services "[a]re the most cost-effective" only those that are actually available 
to the patient are to be considered. In reading Section 31-3 502(18)A, it is notable that 
subparagraph (a) uses the words "would provide" to evaluate whether the choice of care accords 
with what other hypothetical health care providers would choose in that particular situation, i.e., 
the care must be in accordance with the standard of care. In contrast, the remaining 
subparagraphs in Section 31-3502(18)A all use the verb "are." This clearly indicates an intent by 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 14 
40914.0131.11106777.7 
the legislature to differentiate between the requirement that the care must be what a hypothetical 
care provider "would provide" to a patient given the circumstances, and the requirement that the 
services actually available and provided to the patient: "(b) [a]re in accordance with generally 
accepted standards of medical practice"; "(c) [a]re clinically appropriate ... ; "(d) [a]re not 
provided primarily for [ ] convenience ... ; and "(e) [a]re the most cost-effective." 
I.C. § 31-3502A(a)-(e). 
Additionally, when one considers other parts of the Medical Indigency Act, it becomes 
even more clear that actual availability of the services is required. Idaho Code 
Sections 31-3503(2), 3 l-3503A(2), and 31-3507 recognize the interest a county and the board of 
the catastrophic health care cost program ("Cat Board") have in the availability and willingness 
of facilities to treat indigent county residents. Sections 31-3503(2) and 31-3503A(2) authorize 
counties and the CAT Board to contract with medical facilities to provide indigent care. 
Section 31-3507 actually empowers a county or the CAT Board to transfer a patient to a different 
facility within certain parameters that include the availability of care at the transferee facility. 
That is, Section 31-3507 explicitly requires that before the county or Cat Board can require the 
transfer of a medically indigent patient, the requirements of the Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd ("EMTLA") must be met and the "necessary medical 
service must be available" at the receiving facility. LC. § 31-3507 (emphasis added). The 
EMTLA provisions provide: "[a]n appropriate transfer to a medical facility is a transfer ... in 
which the receiving facility (i) has available space and qualified personnel for the treatment of 
the individual, and (ii) has agreed to accept transfer of the individual and to provide appropriate 
medical treatment." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2). Thus, before a medically indigent patient, such 
as the Patient here, can be transferred to another facility there must be a facility that is actually 
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available and willing to receive the patient and can actually provide the necessary treatment. It 
necessarily follows that when considering whether services "[a]re the most cost-effective," the 
services must be actually available to the patient. 
Finally, as will be addressed in more depth below, it is notable that in interpreting a 
subsection of the same statute at issue here, this Court stated, "only those resources actually 
available to an applicant can be considered for purposes of eligibility for medical indigency 
benefits." St. Joseph Reg'! Med Ctr. v. Nez Perce Cnty. Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 486,490, 5 P.3d 
466,470 (2000) (emphasis added) (interpreting Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18)B(g)). 
Thus, when viewed as a whole, the statute clearly contemplates that only those services 
that are actually available to the Patient should be considered when determining whether 
services "[a]re the most cost-effective service or sequence of services[.]" 
b. Considering legislative intent. 
Such an interpretation is also consistent with the intent and purpose of the Medical 
Indigency Act. "[T]he legislature's intent in enacting the medical indigency assistance statutes 
was two-fold: to provide indigents with access to medical care and to allow hospitals to obtain 
compensation for services rendered to indigents." Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143 Idaho 
808, 810, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156 (2007) (quoting Carpenter v. Twin Falls Cnty., 107 Idaho 575, 
582, 691 P.2d 1190, 1197 (1984)). The County's interpretation of the requirements of 
Section 31-3502(18) directly conflicts with that purpose. 
Utilizing hypothetical services, rather than actually available services, to determine that 
care is not compensable undermines the intent of the Medical Indigency Act. That is, doing so 
would result in a provider being faced with the choice of either: (1) discharging a patient home 
before they are clinically approved for discharge, or (2) continuing to treat the indigent patient 
without any compensation. In either scenario, one of the purposes of the Medical Indigency Act 
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is frustrated. Either the indigent patient is denied access to medical care by being discharged to 
home before they are clinically approved; or, the provider is deprived of its right to 
compensation for medical services rendered to an indigent patient ( and in fact incurs additional 
expenses). The legislature did not intend such results. 
Furthermore, the first choice outlined above is not a choice St. Luke's could ethically or 
legally make as it could jeopardize the life of the patient. This leaves the second, and only real 
choice, as the only viable option, which results in the provider being denied compensation and 
incurring additional expense, a scenario expressly against the fundamental policy behind the 
statute. See I.C. § 31-3501 (stating that part of the intent of the Medical Indigency Act is to 
"provide for the payment" of medical services rendered to the medically indigent). Indeed, in 
this case, not only was St. Luke's denied compensation for nearly three weeks of medical 
services to an indigent patient, but St. Luke's ended up contracting to pay for the Patient's care at 
Life Care as a condition to transfer the Patient. Agency Tr., p. 10, 11. 16-25; AR at 320-25. 
That this was not the legislature's intent is further borne out by the fact that the 
legislature recognized the issue of ensuring cost efficiency and saw fit to grant counties and the 
Cat Board the right to "contract with providers, transfer patients, [ and] negotiate provider 
agreements." LC. §§ 31-3503(2); 3 l-3503A(2). In other words, the County and the Cat Board 
have the statutory right to contract with providers to ensure that circumstances such as those that 
have occurred in this case are minimized or eliminated. 
The purpose of the Medical Indigency Act is to ensure that indigent patients receive the 
necessary medical care they need and to ensure that providers receive payment for medical care 
provided to indigent residents. The legislature has provided counties with ample authority to 
ensure that treatment is provided in a cost-effective manner. Interpreting Idaho Code Section 
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31-3502(18) to allow the County to deny payment based on hypothetical, rather than actually 
available services, is inconsistent with the Medical Indigency Act's purpose. 
c. Reasonableness of proposed constructions. 
Although absurdity has no bearing on a statute's plain language, Verska v. 
Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,896,265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011), when engaging 
in statutory interpretation this Court has held that absurd results are disfavored. Stonebrook 
Const. LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 152 Idaho 927,932,277 P.3d 374, 379 (2012) ("Statutory 
constructions that would lead to absurd ... results are disfavored."). 
Here, if Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) were interpreted to allow hypothetical or 
theoretical services, rather than services actually available to a patient, to be considered in 
determining whether services rendered "[a]re the most cost-effective" it would lead to absurd 
and unreasonable results. The facts of this case present the scenario where a lower cost facility 
was unavailable because the facility was not willing to accept the Patient based upon the lack of 
funding. However, there could be other reasons a lower cost facility would not be available to a 
patient that would yield equally absurd results. For example, if the statute were interpreted as the 
County suggests, even facilities that are not in operation in Idaho would have to be considered in 
the medical necessity analysis. As an illustration, in the continuum of medical care, long-term 
acute care hospitals were not in operation in Idaho until fairly recently. 5 Moreover, there are 
numerous other specialty type treatment facilities available nationally or internationally that are 
still not available in Idaho. Yet, under the County's interpretation of the statute, these out-of-
5 
Southwest Idaho Advanced Care Hospital and Complex Care Hospital of Idaho were not 
formed as entities until November 2006 and November 2007, respectively. See Idaho Secretary 
of State website, Viewing Business Entity, Southwest Idaho Advanced Care Hospital, Inc., 
available at https://www.accessidaho.org/public/sos/corp/C 169997.html; id. Complex Care 
Hospital ofldaho, available at https://www.accessidaho.org/public/sos/corp/Dl 17065.html. 
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state specialty hospitals, although clearly unavailable to the patient, would have to be considered 
in determining whether the care was the "most cost-effective service" that could possibly be 
rendered to the patient. 
Another basis that treatment may not be available at a lower cost facility could be bed 
availability. That is, a county medical advisor could say a patient is clinically appropriate for a 
lower level of care, but no appropriate facility has capacity to accept the patient. Indeed, this 
Court directly addressed the issue of bed availability in St. Joseph Regional Medical Center v. 
Nez Perce County Commissioners, 134 Idaho 486, 5 P.3d 466 (2000). In that case, the county 
denied payment to a provider because care was, in theory, available at a state psychiatric facility. 
Id. at 489-90, 5 P.3d at 469-70. However, the facts of the case revealed that there were no beds 
actually available at the state psychiatric facility. Id. at 490, 5 P.3d at 470. This Court held that 
because there were no actual beds available for the patient, the state psychiatric facility could not 
be considered a resource under Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18). Id. Ignoring the reality that a 
lower cost facility is unavailable in the medical necessity analysis would lead to absurd results 
that would undermine the expressly stated purpose of the statute. 
Accordingly, because when the statute is read as a whole, and because it would frustrate 
the intent of the Medical Indigency Act and lead to an absurd result otherwise, even if the Court 
determines that the statute is ambiguous, it should be interpreted to mean that only those services 
that are actually available to the patient should be considered when determining whether the 
services rendered "[a]re the most cost-effective" under Idaho Code Section 31-3502(1 S)A(e). 
Such an interpretation would lead to the same result as discussed above, see supra 
Part IV.A. I, and by denying payment for the dates of service at issue, the Board violated the 
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statutory power and duty granted it under the Medical Indigency Act and thereby exceeded its 
statutory authority. 
B. The Board's Decision Was Unsupported by Substantial Evidence on the 
Record and Was Arbitrary, Capricious, and an Abuse of Discretion. 
"Evidence is substantial and competent only if a reasonable mind might accept such 
evidence as adequate to support a conclusion. To establish whether an agency's action is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, this Court must determine whether the 
agency's findings of fact are reasonable." Cooper v. Bd. of Prof'! Discipline of Idaho State Bd. 
of Med., 134 Idaho 449, 456, 4 P.3d 561, 568 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). Accordingly, "[a] finding of fact without any basis in the record [is] clearly 
erroneous." Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 62, 831 P.2d 527, 530 (1992) (citations omitted). 
"Also, a finding of fact lacking substantial and competent evidence to support it is clearly 
erroneous." Id. In order to uphold the County's decision under the clearly erroneous standard, 
the Court must conclude that the record contains "some reliable, probative, and substantial 
evidence in support of its position." Idaho Cnty. Nursing Home v. Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 
120 Idaho 933, 940, 821 P.2d 988, 995 (1991). 
In St. Joseph, supra, the county denied an application because it found that the patient 
could have received care at lower cost facilities such as a state psychiatric facility or alcohol 
treatment through Port of Hope and Roger's Counseling Center rather than at an acute 
psychiatric hospital where the treatment took place. 134 Idaho 486, 5 P .3d 466 (2000). Relying 
upon the affidavit testimony of a state mental health program manager to that effect, the county 
applied the clinical assessment to the definition of "necessary medical services" and determined 
that because the services the patient had received at the acute psychiatric hospital were "available 
to" the patient "from state, federal and local health programs," the services rendered at the 
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hospital were not "necessary medical services" and therefore denied payment. Id. at 489-90, 5 
P.3d at 469-70. 
However, the factual record in St. Joseph revealed that a voluntary bed at the state 
psychiatric hospital was not available to the patient and that as soon as follow-up treatment could 
be arranged through Roger's Counseling Center, a lower cost facility, the patient was transferred. 
Id. at 490, 5 P.3d at 470. The Court outlined the efforts by the hospital therein to transfer the 
patient and the unavailability of a facility to take the patient until the transfer ultimately took 
place. Id. Based upon these facts, on appeal to the District Court, the District Court "dismantled 
the Board's finding that other resources were available to [the patient]" and determined that 
"none of the documentation upon which the Board based its decision provided any details as to 
whether specific services were actually available to [the patient]." Id. This Court noted that the 
District Court's reasoning was "in accord with authority prescribing that only those resources 
actually available to an applicant can be considered for purposes of eligibility for medical 
indigency benefits," and reversed the Board. Id. ( emphasis added). The Court then went on to 
state that because the only evidence in the record was that the facilities identified by the county 
as "available" to take the patient were not actually available to take the patient, the evidence did 
not support the county's denial. Id. 
The same is true here. The Board denied the dates of service from February 19, 2016, 
through March 9, 2016, because Dr. Dammrose, like the mental health program manager in 
St. Joseph, submitted a report that indicated that the Patient did not need the services of an acute 
care hospital and could have received care at a lower level facility. AR at 38. However, like in 
St. Joseph, it is clear that although St. Luke's pursued those alternative care options at other 
facilities, none of the other facilities were actually available to the Patient during the time period 
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at issue. Tr., p. 27, 11. 2-11. Then, again like in St. Joseph, as soon as a lower level of care 
became available (and only because St. Luke's agreed to pay the Patient's bill) the Patient was 
transferred. Id. Just like in St. Joseph, there is no evidence in the record that care at a lower 
level facility was available to the Patient at any time before March 9, 2016. Indeed, the County 
does not even allege the actual availability of a facility willing to provide a lower level of care 
and in fact admits that St. Luke's did what it should have. See generally Agency Tr., pp. 3-21 
(County does not dispute that there were no other available facilities or suggest that there was a 
facility other than St. Luke's that was actually available to the Patient); Agency Tr., p. 20, 11. 4-6. 
Like in St. Joseph, the Board's decision to deny service for the dates at issue was not 
supported by the evidence in the record. As a result, the Board's decision was arbitrary, 
capricious, and an abuse of discretion. This case should accord with the holding in St. Joseph. 
The Court should reverse the County's denial of dates of service February 19, 2016, through 
March 9, 2016, because the only evidence in the record is that the more "cost-efficient" care 
identified by the County was not actually available to the Patient. 
C. St. Luke's Substantial Rights Have Been Prejudiced. 
The Medical Indigency Act grants hospital providers the right to compensation for 
providing necessary medical care to indigent patients. Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143 
Idaho 808, 810, 153 P.3d 1154, 1156 (2007) ("[T]he legislature's intent in enacting the medical 
indigency assistance statutes was two-fold: to provide indigents with access to medical care and 
to allow hospitals to obtain compensation for services rendered to indigents." (quoting Carpenter 
v. Twin Falls Cnty., 107 Idaho 575,582,691 P.2d 1190, 1197 (1984))); St. Luke's Magic Valley 
Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs of Gooding Cnty., 150 Idaho 484,488,248 P.3d 
735, 739 (2011) ("[T]he Medical Indigency Act was meant to ensure that hospitals obtain actual 
compensation for the care provided to indigent patients."). 
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Here, there is no question that the Patient was indigent. Tr., p. 34, 11. 10-13. By denying 
compensation for dates of service February 19, 2016, to March 9, 2016, when the only evidence 
in the record was that the Patient could not be discharged home and St. Luke's was the only 
provider that was actually available to provide the necessary services to the Patient, the Board 
violated St. Luke's right to compensation for providing necessary medical services to an indigent 
patient. By depriving St. Luke's of its statutory right to compensation, St. Luke's substantial 
rights have been prejudiced. See generally, e.g., St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd., 
150 Idaho 484, 248 P.3d 735 (noting in the standard of review that a substantial right must be 
prejudiced to overturn the Board's decision and then proceeding to overturn the Board's decision 
to deny the provider compensation because the Board's decision was contrary to the Medical 
Indigency Act). 
D. St. Luke's Is Entitled to Reasonable Attorney's Fees. 
St. Luke's requests attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-117(1), 
which provides that "the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment 
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." LC. § 12-117(1). A party acts 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law when it "has no authority to take a particular action." 
Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada Cnty., 143 Idaho 808, 812, 153 P.3d 1154, 1158 (2007) (quoting 
Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349,356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005)). 
As the foregoing clearly demonstrates, the County had no authority or evidence to 
support denial of the dates of service February 19, 2016, through March 9, 2016. Not only does 
the application of undisputed facts to the plain language of the statute demonstrate error, but a 
well-established medical indigency decision by the Idaho Supreme Court directly addresses the 
impropriety of denial based on more cost-effective service options without corresponding 
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evidence that such options were "actually available" to a patient. St. Luke's presented ample 
undisputed evidence that the services Dr. Dammrose references were not actually available until 
March 9, 2016. There was no evidence in the record, or even an allegation by the County, that 
services at a lower level facility were actually available to the Patient. The Board's decision had 
no basis in law or fact. Accordingly, St. Luke's respectfully requests an award of costs and 
attorney's fees. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Idaho Code Section 31-3502(18) requires that services be actually available before they 
can be considered in determining whether services provided to a patient "[a]re the most cost-
efficient services[.]" The only argument presented by the County at the hearing before the Board 
was that the denial of the Patient's treatment for dates of service February 19, 2016, through 
March 9, 2016, was because the services provided were not the "most cost-effective services[.]" 
While St. Luke's does not dispute that care at a lower level facility would have been appropriate 
from a clinical standpoint, the undisputed evidence before the Board demonstrated that care at a 
lower level facility was not actually available to this Patient. Because St. Luke's services were 
the only services actually available to the Patient, they were, by definition, the most cost-
effective. As such, those services met the statutory definition of necessary medical services and 
St. Luke's has a right to be compensated for those services. The County's denial of the dates of 
service at issue was a violation of statutory provisions and exceeded its statutory authority. 
Further, it is clear that the Board acted without a basis in substantial evidence and in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner. 
St. Luke's, therefore, requests that the Court award its costs and attorney's fees and 
vacate the decision of the District Court and remand this matter to the District Court with 
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instructions to remand to the Board for approval of payment for dates of service February 19, 
2016, through March 9, 2016. 
DATED THIS 30th day of May, 2018. 
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